Estimating The Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Comment by Blonigen, Bruce A. et al.
 
Estimating The Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational 
Enterprise: Comment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bruce A. Blonigena, Ronald B. Daviesb, and Keith Headc 
 
 
March 2002 
 
 
JEL Classification: F13, F23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* We would like to thank Robert Feenstra, Stephen Haynes, James Markusen, Keith Maskus, Kaoru 
Nabeshima, Matt Slaughter, Jim Ziliak and participants of a 2002 American Economics Association 
session for helpful discussions and comments. We also thank Sarah Lawson for excellent research 
assistance.  All remaining errors or omissions are our own. 
 
a Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, 97403-1285, Phone: (541) 346-
4680, E-mail: bruceb@oregon.uoregon.edu 
b Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, 97403-1285, Phone: (541) 346-
4671, E-mail: rdavies@oregon.uoregon.edu 
c Faculty of Commerce, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, V6T1Z2, 
Canada, Phone: (604) 822-8492, E-mail: keith.head@ubc.ca 
A recent American Economic Review article by David L. Carr, James R. Markusen, and Keith E. 
Maskus (CMM) estimates a regression specification based upon the “knowledge-capital” model of the 
Multinational Enterprise (MNE).  The knowledge-capital model combines “horizontal” motivations for 
FDI—the desire to place production close to customers and thereby avoid trade costs—with “vertical” 
motivations—the desire to carry out unskilled-labor intensive production activities in locations with 
relatively abundant unskilled labor.  By way of contrast, the horizontal model, an intellectual antecedent 
of the knowledge-capital model, precludes the separation of knowledge-generating activities from 
production and therefore generates different policy implications.  CMM’s summary states that the results 
“fit well with the [knowledge-capital] theory.  We hope that the model will therefore prove useful in 
future analysis.”  In this comment, we argue that rather than offering direct support for the knowledge-
capital model, the data set used by CMM cannot reject the horizontal model of MNEs in favor of the 
knowledge-capital model. 
The crux of the distinction between the knowledge capital model and the horizontal model lies 
with the estimate of the effect of skill differences on the level of affiliate activity in the host country.  
CMM find that the increases in the parent-country's relative skill endowment raise affiliate sales in the 
host country as long as the parent country is small.  However, this effect of skill differences is decreasing 
in the parent-host GDP difference.  They interpret these results as support for the knowledge-capital 
model of MNEs.  We demonstrate that this finding arises because of a misspecification of the skill 
difference terms in their empirical framework.  When corrected, we find that absolute skill differences 
reduce affiliate sales.  This instead supports the horizontal model of the MNE and suggests that it cannot 
be rejected in favor of the knowledge-capital model.  Our findings are robust to alternative specifications 
using both U.S. and OECD data.  
Interest in MNEs has grown considerably in recent years for two main reasons.  First, flows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), the defining activity of MNEs, have grown at substantial rates over the 
last two decades, outstripping the rate of growth of both world output and international trade.  Second, 
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there has been an increasingly vocal public and academic debate on the effects of FDI, particularly with 
respect to labor market effects.  This debate has been informed by several models of FDI, particularly 
those of Markusen and co-authors.1  These models are especially relevant to the debate on FDI and wages 
because they suggest many different motives for engaging in FDI and thus many different potential labor 
market effects.  For example, affiliate activity in foreign countries is less likely to have a negative impact 
on unskilled home-country workers in a horizontal model than a knowledge-capital model. 
As with the literature testing models of international trade, researchers have turned to the data to 
select the most appropriate model of the MNE.  CMM develops an empirical framework to study the 
efficacy of the knowledge-capital model of MNE activity.  The CMM estimates pool inward and outward 
U.S. affiliate sales data from 1986 through 1994 and appear to support the knowledge-capital model of 
the MNE.  In particular, the terms they use as proxies for skilled-labor abundance differences between 
countries, the key variables identifying vertical MNE motivations, have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant.  However, in related work, Markusen and Maskus (1999, 2001) find evidence 
conflicting with the knowledge capital model using the same database. 
  In this comment on CMM we resolve this apparent puzzle.  We show that CMM’s empirical 
framework mis-specifies the terms measuring differences in skilled-labor abundance.  After correcting 
this specification error, the coefficient estimates no longer support the knowledge capital model.  Instead, 
the data strongly support the predictions of the horizontal model of MNEs: affiliate activity between 
countries decreases as absolute differences in skill-labor abundance widen.  Further, we strengthen the 
evidence for this result by showing that the negative relationship between FDI activity and dissimilarity in 
skilled-labor abundance is also found using data that include a wider variety of parent and host countries, 
including data for the OECD.  Finally, we show exactly how the difference between CMM and Markusen 
and Maskus (1999;2001) follows directly from the misspecification of skill differences. 
                                                          
1 These include James R. Markusen (1984, 1997), Ignatius J. Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 1992), 
Markusen and Anthony J. Venables (1997, 1998, 2000), and Markusen, Venables, Denise Eby-Konan, 
and Kevin Honglin Zhang (1996). 
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This paper proceeds as follows.  In section I, we briefly summarize the varied theories of FDI and 
survey the small empirical literature on the determinants of FDI.  In this same section, we detail the 
specification error in the CMM empirical framework used to estimate the knowledge-capital model. 
Section II uses the CMM dataset to illustrate the stark change in coefficient estimates when we correct the 
specification error and shows that the same coefficient patterns appear in alternative U.S. and OECD 
samples of MNE activity.  We do not find support in any of these data sets for rejecting the horizontal 
model in favor of the knowledge-capital model.  Section III concludes. 
 
I. Recent Evidence on MNE Models: A Puzzle 
 Relative to many prior empirical studies of FDI, the CMM approach represents a step forward 
because it bases its framework in the formal theories of the multinational firm.  These theories can be 
divided into three rough categories: the horizontal model, the vertical model, and the knowledge-capital 
model.  The horizontal model originates in Markusen (1984) and describes a firm with plants that engage 
in the same activity in multiple locations.  This model posits that FDI arises from an interaction between 
firm-level economies of scale and trade costs.  Markusen and Venables (2000) show that, in the horizontal 
model, dissimilarity in relative endowments reduce the activity of MNEs; thus the horizontal model 
predicts that absolute skill differences should be negatively related to FDI activity. 
The vertical model, first formalized by Elhanan Helpman (1984), builds an incentive to locate 
different activities in different countries in order to take advantage of factor cost differences.  One strong 
prediction of this model is that FDI should only flow from the skill-abundant country to the unskilled 
country (since a firm’s nationality is identified with the location of its skill-intensive headquarters).  
Furthermore, when countries are identical, there is no reason to engage in FDI since there are no cost 
differences to exploit. 
 More recently, Markusen, et. al. (1996) and Markusen (1997) have developed the knowledge-
capital model tested in CMM.  This model integrates the horizontal and vertical models and allows for 
both multi-plant scale economies and exploitation of factor price differences.  Since the knowledge-
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capital model is a combination of the horizontal and vertical models, it comes as no surprise that skill 
differences can have positive and negative effects.  Specifically, a rise in skilled labor-abundance 
differences tends to increase FDI from the skilled country to the host (as predicted by the vertical model).  
This effect diminishes, however, when the unskilled host is small.  Thus, while the total effect of skill 
differences is ambiguous due to the interactions with country size, a more-skilled large parent country 
should have more outbound FDI than a less-skilled or a small parent country. 
 A key distinction between the pure horizontal model and the knowledge-capital model is that the 
former assumes that headquarter services and production use factors in the same proportions.  In contrast, 
the knowledge-capital model assumes the headquarter services use skilled-labor more intensively than all 
other activities.  Nevertheless, there are regimes in the knowledge-capital model where multinationals of 
the horizontal form (plants in more than one country, headquarter services in only one) do emerge.  This 
occurs when relative endowments are similar since this removes the factor price differences that generate 
the incentives for the vertical form.  Thus, observing MNE activity between countries of similar factor 
proportions does not violate the knowledge-capital model.  Nevertheless, the distinguishing feature is that 
a divergence in relative factor endowments reduces production of foreign affiliates in both countries in 
the horizontal model, but can increase it in the knowledge-capital model. 
 With three alternative models of MNE activity, empirical investigation naturally followed, 
including a set of papers by Markusen and Maskus: CMM, Markusen and Maskus (2001), and Markusen 
and Maskus (1999).2  All three use data on U.S. affiliate sales abroad (outbound affiliate sales) and sales 
of foreign affiliates in the U.S. (inbound affiliate sales) from 1986 through 1994 to investigate the various 
models of MNE activity.  All three papers motivate reduced-form empirical specifications from simulated 
topologies of MNE activity over alternative variable and parameter spaces derived from the general 
equilibrium modeling of Markusen in previous theory work.  The topologies are often nonlinear, leading 
                                                          
2 S. Lael Brainard (1997) develops a horizontal MNE model where firms are located to foreign markets 
for “proximity advantages” and finds evidence consistent with the horizontal model using U.S. data. 
Karolina Ekholm (1995, 1997, 1998a,b) empirically examines implications of Markusen’s knowledge-
capital model, but does not try to connect it as directly to the theory as in the three papers we discuss in 
this section. 
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to interaction and squared terms in the empirical specification.  In particular, CMM pools observations of 
both inbound and outbound U.S. affiliate sales, tests it on a theory-motivated empirical specification of 
the knowledge-capital model and finds seemingly robust support for this MNE model.  Markusen and 
Maskus (2001) extend CMM work by exploring additional empirical implications of the knowledge-
capital model and estimating whether these exist in the same data set of inbound and outbound U.S. 
affiliate activity.  While that paper still concludes that there is substantial evidence for the knowledge-
capital model, they find a surprising result that skilled-labor abundance differences (parent minus host) 
are significantly negatively related to FDI activity in the outbound U.S. data.  Furthermore, the coefficient 
on skill differences interacted with GDP differences is positive and significant.  These results conflict 
with the predictions CMM provide for the knowledge-capital model. 
Markusen and Maskus (2001) suggest that the difference with CMM could derive from two 
sources.  First, the theory models a two-country world where total world endowments are fixed, whereas 
their dataset contains observations on country-pair observations with varying endowment totals.  Since it 
is unclear what impact this might have on the model’s predictions, the results for outbound affiliate 
activity in Markusen and Maskus (2001) may not contradict the knowledge-capital model.  Second, they 
note that it may be problematic that the U.S. is one of the two countries in every country-pair observation 
in their sample.  Since the U.S. is substantially larger than every other country, this restricts the 
observations to only a certain region of the parameter space, which could then skew the empirical results. 
 Finally, Markusen and Maskus (1999) use the same database of U.S. inbound and outbound 
affiliate activity as in CMM to examine an empirical specification that they present as nesting all three 
models of MNE activity: horizontal, vertical and knowledge-capital.  Their empirical framework differs 
from that found in CMM.  Whereas CMM specified skill differences as the difference between the 
skilled-labor abundance of the parent to the host country, Markusen and Maskus (1999) include additional 
interaction terms that indicate when this relative skill difference between the parent and host country is 
positive versus when it is negative; i.e., when the parent country is relatively skilled-labor abundant 
versus when the parent country is skilled-labor deficient.  As we explain and demonstrate in this paper, 
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this distinction between regions when the skill difference is negative versus when it is positive is critical.  
The empirical evidence in Markusen and Maskus (1999) strongly supports the horizontal model, and 
rejects the vertical and knowledge-capital models, which contrasts sharply with the conclusion of CMM. 
 Taken together, the recent evidence on MNE models presents a puzzle.  Since all three papers use 
the same database on U.S. inbound and outbound MNE activity and are derived from the knowledge-
capital model, why do they produce contradictory results regarding skill differences? 
 As the effect of differences between the parent and host country skill endowments is the major 
distinction between the predictions of the knowledge-capital and horizontal models, the resolution of the 
puzzle rests with this issue.  The key is to realize that interpretation of the coefficients on such a 
difference variable depend critically on whether the sign of the difference term is negative or positive.  
When the skill difference term lies in the positive range, an increase in the variable corresponds to a to 
greater inequality in relative skill endowments.  However, when the skill difference term is negative, 
parent and host country skill endowments converge as the difference term rises.  As a result, it is incorrect 
to estimate a pooled coefficient on a difference term that takes both positive and negative values in the 
sample.  As shown by Stephen E. Haynes and Joe A. Stone (1984), difference terms impose a subtractive 
linear constraint which can lead to a sign reversal in the pooled (or restricted) coefficient.  Haynes and 
Stone show that this sign reversal indeed occurs in the estimation of a real interest rate differential model 
of the exchange rate by Jeffrey Frankel (1979), and we likewise show the same problem of sign reversal 
occurs in CMM. 
For the bilateral U.S. affiliate data used by the papers discussed above, the skill difference term 
lies predominately in the positive region for U.S. outbound affiliate activity and predominately in the 
negative range for the inbound affiliate activity in the U.S.  With both inbound and outbound affiliate 
sales pooled into one sample as in CMM, it is difficult to interpret the single coefficient on the skill 
difference term since it takes both positive and negative values.  If the knowledge-capital model is correct 
and one separates out the skill difference terms into those observations where it is in the positive region 
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(i.e., outbound U.S. affiliate activity) and the negative region (i.e., inbound activity), we would expect the 
same coefficient signs in both regions. In contrast, the horizontal model predicts opposing signs. 
In fact, Markusen and Maskus (2001) obtain “correct” signs for the knowledge-capital model in 
the inbound sample, whereas the outbound sample has the reverse signs.  Thus FDI activity decreases 
when absolute skill differences rise.  Even more convincingly, Markusen and Maskus (1999) specifically 
take into account the expected sign reversal by interacting the skill difference with a dummy variable 
indicating whether the difference term is in the negative or positive region.  They conclude that the since 
the signs in their empirical analysis are exactly the opposite of those predicted by the knowledge-capital 
model in CMM, the data supports the horizontal model.  In their discussion of this discrepancy between 
the two papers, they do not attribute the resolution of the puzzle to the issue of whether the difference 
term is generally in the negative region or the positive region.  
 
II. Results 
 To examine our proposed resolution, we obtained the data used in CMM from the authors.  We 
were able to exactly replicate their results for all their reported specifications.  Columns 1 and 3 of our 
Table 1 show coefficient estimates for the knowledge-capital model using OLS and Tobit specifications 
that correspond exactly to those CMM report in their Table 3.   
We then modify their framework into what we term an absolute value model where we specify 
the skill difference and GDP difference terms as absolute values.  Specification of the difference terms in 
absolute values implies that the new variable is always increasing in skill dissimilarity.  This facilitates 
interpretation of coefficients and marginal effects of these regressors.  Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1 report 
coefficient estimates for our absolute value version of the knowledge-capital model for the OLS and Tobit 
specifications, respectively.   The results are striking.  The coefficients on both the absolute skill 
difference term and its interaction with the absolute GDP difference are statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level and of opposite signs to those of CMM.  The independent effect of skill differences 
now strongly suggests that real affiliate sales decrease as skill levels diverge – the opposite result from the 
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sign predicted by CMM for the knowledge-capital model.  Likewise, the interaction term of skill 
difference with GDP difference has the opposite sign and statistically significant at the 1% level when the 
difference terms are specified in absolute values.  This too conflicts with the predicted sign of the 
knowledge-capital model.3  Finally, the R2 rises substantially in the OLS model when using the absolute 
value model (from 0.46 to 0.59) and the value of the log-likelihood increases for the Tobit specification 
(from -5755 to -5716).  The original CMM article also presented a weighted least squares (WLS) 
specification, as well as host-country fixed effects versions of the OLS, WLS and Tobit specifications. 
We obtain identical changes in the signs of the skill-difference regressors when using the absolute value 
model that are statistically significant at the 1% level for all of these additional specifications (these 
results are available upon request).  In summary, once these skill difference terms are appropriately 
specified, the data offer no support for the predictions of the knowledge-capital model with respect to 
skill differences between countries  
 The use of an absolute difference model, however, still involves a restriction that skill differences 
have symmetric effects on real affiliate sales.  In other words, the relationship between absolute skill 
differences and real affiliate sales is identical for instances where the parent country is more skilled 
abundant compared to the host (skill difference term is positive in value), as well as where the host 
country is more skilled abundant compared to the parent (skill difference term is negative in value).  In 
the U.S. data used by CMM, the former instance of positive skill differences is almost entirely 
observations of U.S. affiliate sales abroad (outbound affiliate sales), and the latter instance is almost 
entirely observations of foreign affiliate sales in the U.S. (inbound affiliate sales).   
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, we split the CMM sample into observations where the skill 
difference is always positive and where the skill difference term is always negative.  If divergence in skill 
levels leads to a symmetric decline in real affiliate sales, then we should expect a negative coefficient on 
the skill difference term in the sample of positive skill differences and a positive coefficient for the 
                                                          
3 The other RHS term in which skill difference enters in the CMM empirical framework is the interaction of the 
squared Skill Difference with Trade Cost Host.  Since it is squared, no absolute value correction is needed for this 
term. 
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sample of negative skill differences and they should be of comparable magnitude.  The signs of 
coefficients in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 confirm the sign expectation and again support the horizontal 
model predictions.  The magnitudes, however, are not of equal size, with the coefficient on skill 
difference for the sample of negative skill differences almost three times as large.  As we will discuss 
below, the marginal effects of skill differences on real affiliate sales (which also takes into account the 
interactions of skill difference with GDP difference and host-country trade costs) exhibit a similar change 
in magnitude.  
 For comparison, columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 provide estimates for separate samples of outbound 
and inbound affiliate activity.  The coefficients on the skill difference terms likewise show opposite signs 
across the sample indicating that real affiliate sales and absolute skill differences are negatively related, in 
contrast with CMM’s predictions for the knowledge-capital model.  For the outbound-inbound split, the 
skill-difference coefficient is now larger for the outbound sample, not the inbound sample.  This is 
seemingly inconsistent with the positive-negative sample split.  However, in the marginal effects reported 
below, once one takes into account the interaction terms, the relative effects of skill difference on affiliate 
activity are qualitatively identical: an increase in skill difference leads to a decrease in affiliate activity 
that is approximately three times larger for the inbound (negative skill difference) sample as the outbound 
(positive skill difference) sample. 
 It is important to note that the opposite coefficients for the inbound and outbound sample 
correspond to the results found by Markusen and Maskus (2001).  It is clear these opposing coefficient 
estimates for the two samples come from the fact that the skill difference is primarily negative in value in 
the inbound sample and positive in the outbound sample. 
 
A. Marginal Effects. 
 Given the interaction terms involving the skill difference term in the CMM framework, the 
coefficient estimate on the skill difference term is not the marginal effect.  For the OLS and WLS 
regressions, the marginal effect is 
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∂ (Real Affiliate Sales)/∂ (Skill Difference) =  
                B3 + B4 (GDP Difference) + 2*B7*(Trade Cost Host)*(Skill Difference), 
 
where B3 is the estimated coefficient on the skill difference term, B4 is the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction between skill difference and GDP difference, and B7 is the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction between skill difference squared and host country-trade costs.4   In Table 3 we report marginal 
effects for a standard deviation change in skill differences for our absolute value models in Table 1 and 
our sample splits in Table 2.  The marginal effects in every case correspond to the estimated coefficient 
on the skill difference term by itself.  In other words, the interaction terms are not counteracting the 
estimated independent effect of skill differences, and our inferences that skill differences are inversely 
related to real sales activity are confirmed and statistically significant. 
The marginal effects for the specifications that correctly model skill differences all suggest an 
inverse relationship between skill differences and real affiliate sales activity that is substantial in 
magnitude.  For example, at the means of the data, a standard deviation increase in the absolute skill 
difference (a change in the share of a country’s skilled worker share of approximately 10 percentage 
points) reduces real affiliate sales by $7.1 billion in the OLS absolute value model, where the average real 
affiliate sales in the sample is $15.8 billion.   When the sample is split into inbound and outbound 
activity, the economic effect of skill differences on real affiliate sales is revealed to be much more 
pronounced for inbound activity, where an increase in skill dissimilarity (a negative change in the skill 
difference term for all observations that are negative) leads to a $8.0 billion decrease in real affiliate sales.  
This effect is over three times larger than the $2.3 billion decrease on the outbound side for a standard 
deviation increase in skill differences.  
Marginal effects of skill difference on real affiliate sales are also calculated and discussed in 
result 4 of CMM.  Rather than calculating a single marginal effect at the means of the data, they calculate 
marginal effects for every bilateral pairing in the sample for the year 1991 and then report separate 
marginal effects for inbound and outbound observations.  The signs of their marginal effects for inbound 
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and outbound observations agree with the results we report here (real affiliate sales negatively related to 
absolute skill differences), even though their coefficient estimates on the skill difference terms are 
completely the opposite of ours.  The reason CMM obtain negative marginal effects in the outbound 
sample despite a positive coefficient on the skill difference term (B3) is the presence of the negative 
coefficient on the interaction between skill and GDP differences (B4).  As the US has a much higher GDP 
than the countries it invests in, the outbound sample’s marginal effects are dominated by the GDP 
difference interaction term.  While their marginal effects correspond in sign to ours, their marginal effects 
are still based on coefficient estimates that incorrectly pooled inbound and outbound observations.5   As a 
result, we find that their marginal effects strongly understate the relationship between skill differences 
and affiliate activity for any comparable calculation.6   
In the end, our estimates suggest a significant negative relationship between skill dissimilarity 
and real affiliate sales for both inbound and outbound MNE activity.  A simple scatterplot of the data also 
provides persuasive visual evidence of this relationship.  Figure 1 plots real affiliate sales (averaged from 
1986 to 1994) activity versus the skill difference term.  MNE affiliate sales are largest when skill 
differences are closest to zero and decline as skill differences increase in either direction.  While not 
perfectly comparable, Figure 1 suggests a theoretical relationship that is much more in line with figures of 
horizontal MNE activity in Markusen and Maskus (1999).  Those figures differ from Figure 2 of CMM 
which depicts affiliate sales for a parent country in an Edgeworth box where the skill difference term gets 
more positive as one moves northwest from the diagonal and more negative as one moves southeast off 
the diagonal.  Interestingly, Figure 2 of CMM is consistent with an inverse relationship between skill 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Marginal effects of the Tobit specifications must also take into account the truncation of the sample, which was 
apparently not done in CMM – see Panel E of Table 2. 
5 In other words, marginal effects depend on 1) the coefficient estimates and 2) the value of the variables used for 
the interaction terms: skill difference, GDP difference, and host trade cost.  By calculating marginal effects at values 
of the data that corresponded to various inbound and outbound observations, CMM got closer to properly adjusting 
for the problem with the skill and GDP difference terms, but their marginal effects still use pooled coefficient 
estimates that did not account for this problem.   
6 Table 3 obviously compares marginal effects calculated at the means of the data.  Another comparison can be 
made by calculating the marginal effects for every observation in the sample for both studies and then comparing the 
value of the median marginal effect from each sample.  Their median marginal effect suggests that a standard 
deviation increase in skill differences leads to a $1.04 billion fall in real affiliate sales, whereas ours suggests a 
$19.85 billion fall. 
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differences and affiliate sales for negative skill differences between the parent and host, but the same 
figure also shows little to no MNE activity unless the parent is not too skill-deficient from the host 
country.  Predictions of little MNE activity for a skill-deficient parent are also displayed for the horizontal 
model in Markusen and Maskus (1999).  This contrasts with the U.S. data that shows surprising inbound 
MNE activity from parent countries that are substantially skill-deficient to the U.S.  Of course, the figures 
of affiliate activity created in CMM and Markusen and Maskus (1999) are for certain fixed parameter 
values, so it is not clear whether reasonable parameter values would yield figures that correspond more 
closely with the data. 
 
B.  Exploring Alternative Samples. 
The CMM data cover a relatively small group of countries and years.  Additionally, every 
observation of a bilateral country pair includes the United States, causing concern that the variation in the 
data is confined to only particular parameter spaces.  For example, there are very few examples in the data 
of parent countries that are smaller than the host country, but which have a positive skill difference.7  The 
main reasons why the CMM data are limited in country and year coverage are data availability for their 
trade and investment cost variables and, to some extent, their proxy for skilled labor.   
As a robustness check we constructed two alternative samples to estimate the knowledge-capital 
model.  The first is what we call the modified U.S. sample.  We make a number of changes to the 
variables used as proxies and expand the U.S. sample in the process.  In particular, we use data on 
average educational attainment by country and year as a proxy for skilled-labor abundance, rather than the 
share of labor listed in skilled occupations that was used by CMM.  Second, we turn to alternative trade 
and investment cost data that allowed greater coverage.  Third, we used Penn World Table data for real 
GDP.8  Finally we use affiliate sales in all industries whereas CMM use sales in the manufacturing sector 
only (this feature of their data, not noted in the paper, results in a reduction in the sample of available 
                                                          
7 A couple exceptions are some of the European countries which are indicated as relatively skilled-labor abundant to 
the U.S. in the data.  But even in these cases the skill differences are very small. 
8 This step actually limits the sample to years through 1992, rather than 1994, as in CMM. 
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countries because of disclosure issues.)  The combined effect of these changes is a sample comprising 
over 50 percent more observations covering a slightly different set of countries, over somewhat different 
years, with quite different proxies for our variables.  The appendix has details on data sources, variable 
construction and descriptive statistics. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that despite the many changes in the sample and variable 
construction, we obtain the same OLS results using this modified U.S. sample as we did in Table 1 using 
the CMM data sample.  Estimation of the CMM framework with simple skill and GDP difference terms 
yields a relatively small positive coefficient on the skill difference term, while the absolute value model 
yields a much larger negative coefficient, which contradicts the predicted signs of the knowledge-capital 
model.  As reported in Table 3, the marginal effect for the absolute value model is also statistically 
significant and suggests a strong inverse relationship between skill differences and real affiliate sales.  
Running separate samples of inbound and outbound observations (or positive and negative skill-
difference observations) for this modified U.S. sample again suggests, as with the CMM sample, that the 
inverse relationship between absolute skill differences and real affiliate sales is much more substantial for 
inbound affiliate activity (or where parent-host skill differences are negative).  These results are available 
on request. 
The second alternative we consider is a sample of FDI activity involving OECD countries, which 
helps to alleviate the problems caused by using a sample where one of the countries in every bilateral-pair 
observation is the U.S.   We collected OECD data on FDI stock, since data on affiliate sales for countries 
other than the U.S. are generally not collected, and matched these data with the proxy variables for GDP, 
skill, and trade/investment costs used in our modified U.S. sample.  This created a sample of 2460 
covering 15 OECD parent countries and 38 host countries (some OECD and some non-OECD) over the 
years 1982 through 1992.  Again, this is an important sample to consider because it considers a much 
broader range of possible bilateral pairings than when one is confined to data where the U.S. is 
necessarily one of the countries in the bilateral pair.  In addition, the constructed dataset includes almost 
2500 observations – a much larger sample than either of the two U.S. samples we use.  The tradeoff is 
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that the data are likely not as accurate, with greater measurement error with the FDI stock data proxying 
for affiliate activity and measurement consistency problems across countries.  In the appendix, we discuss 
these issues further, as well as details on data sources, variable construction and descriptive statistics. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report OLS results for the CMM difference model and our absolute 
difference model for this OECD sample.  The results are consistent with our findings using U.S. data.  
The CMM difference model gives a pooled coefficient that is positive on the skill difference term, while 
the absolute value model estimates an inverse relationship between skill differences and our dependent 
variable, real FDI stock.  While the coefficient on the absolute skill difference term is not statistically 
significant at standard confidence levels, the marginal effect of absolute skill differences (as reported in 
Table 3) is substantial and statistically significant.  At the means of the data, a standard deviation increase 
in the skill difference term (about 2.5 years difference in average educational attainment) means a $3.3 
billion decrease in FDI stock by the parent country in the host country.  This is a substantial amount, 
given a sample average of $4.3 billion FDI stock.  These results provide some evidence that the negative 
relationship between absolute skill differences and FDI activity is a worldwide phenomenon, not confined 
to the U.S. 
 
III.  Conclusions 
 This paper identifies and corrects an econometric specification problem that led to incorrect 
inferences in CMM about the efficacy of the knowledge-capital model.  The empirical framework of 
CMM estimates coefficients on difference terms that must be interpreted in an opposite manner 
depending on whether such difference terms are negative or positive in value.  CMM incorrectly 
estimate pooled coefficients over a sample of negative- and positive-valued difference terms.  Their 
estimates coincidently affirm the predictions of the knowledge-capital model.  However, when a 
correct specification of the difference terms is employed, either by taking absolute values or running 
separate samples for positive and negative-valued observations, we obtain coefficient signs that do 
not support the knowledge-capital model.  These results arise not only for the sample of U.S. bilateral 
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observations on MNE affiliate sales employed by CMM, but also for U.S. samples with alternative 
proxies for key variables, as well as a sample of FDI activity across OECD countries.  
 Beyond pointing out the econometric misspecification in CMM, this comment also shows 
that a variety of databases on MNE activity show a strong negative relationship between skill 
dissimilarity and affiliate sales.  This evidence suggests that Markusen and Venables’ (2000) 
horizontal model of FDI cannot be rejected in favor of the knowledge-capital model of Markusen et al 
(1996).  We acknowledge that it is possible for skill dissimilarity to be inversely related to affiliate 
sales in the knowledge-capital model, but this is true only for certain parameter spaces of the 
knowledge-capital model.  In general, the vertical MNE features of the knowledge-capital model, 
which would suggest greater MNE activity for greater skill differences, are at odds with the broad 
trends in the data.  We caution that this does not necessarily imply that vertical MNE activity does not 
exist in the real world, but simply reflects that the preponderance of activity is horizontal in nature or, 
at least, between the rich countries of the world, where skill differences are relatively small.9   
On a final note, we have used the CMM empirical specification to test the predictions of the 
knowledge-capital model.  As CMM note, the underlying theoretical MNE model is quite complex, 
requiring numerical methods to solve a system of over 40 equations.  As a matter of necessity, one 
must therefore work empirically with approximations of the model.  The problem of identifying the 
most appropriate empirical specification within which to test MNE model implications merits further 
research.
                                                          
9 For example, see Hanson and Feenstra (1999), Slaughter (2000), and Hanson et al. (2001), for evidence of U.S. 
vertical MNE activity.  
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Table 1: OLS Results using CMM Results Versus Results from Absolute Difference Version 
of Knowledge-capital model. 
 OLS  Tobit 
 
Regressors 
Table 3 
Results from  
CMM 
Absolute 
Difference 
Model 
Table 3 
Results from 
CMM 
Absolute 
Difference 
Model 
GDP Sum  
   10.80** 
(7.01) 
 
     17.57** 
(12.13) 
 
    15.04** 
(10.27) 
 
     21.24** 
(15.02) 
GDP Difference Squared - 0.0012** 
(-6.89) 
- 0.0040** 
(-14.77) 
- 0.0010** 
(-5.89) 
 - 0.0037** 
(-13.19) 
Skill Difference  
(= Skillp - Skillh) 
   33743** 
(3.77) 
 
 
   61700** 
(7.28) 
 
Skill Difference * GDP 
Difference (= (Skillp - Skillh)* 
(GDPp - GDPh)) 
   - 6.34** 
(-2.62) 
  - 10.20** 
(-4.34) 
 
 
Absolute Skill Difference 
( = | Skillp - Skillh | ) 
    - 1485525** 
(-12.85) 
   - 1428759** 
(-12.07) 
Absolute Skill Difference * 
Absolute GDP Difference  
(=  | Skillp - Skillh | * |GDPp - 
GDPh | ) 
    253.39** 
(12.08) 
    234.21** 
(10.87) 
Investment Cost Host   - 516.6** 
(-3.79) 
- 173.1 
(-1.75) 
  - 387.6** 
(-2.82) 
         229.8 
(2.39) 
Trade Cost Host 119.2 
(1.16) 
- 109.2 
(-1.08) 
156.2 
(1.51) 
- 227.3* 
(-2.22) 
Trade Cost Host * Squared 
Skill Difference 
605.2 
(0.36) 
       5997** 
   (2.84) 
-1264 
(-0.75) 
    6896** 
(3.15) 
Trade Cost Parent         - 93.7 
(-0.99) 
       - 108.6 
(-1.32) 
      - 122.0 
(-1.46) 
 - 201.2** 
(-2.75) 
Distance   - 1.82** 
(-7.75) 
    - 1.31** 
(-6.34) 
    -1.48** 
(-6.47) 
   - 1.00** 
(-4.86) 
Intercept        16630 
(1.08) 
   57437** 
(4.18) 
     - 23283 
(-1.61) 
       17300 
(1.29) 
 
Observations 
 
 509 
 
 509 
 
628 
 
628 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.59   
Log-likelihood         - 5755        -5716 
NOTES:  p = parent, h = host.  t-statistics are in parentheses with ** and * denoting statistical 
significance (two-tailed test) at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 2: OLS Results Using CMM Framework to Compare Estimates from Sample with Positive 
Skill Differences Versus Sample with Negative Skill Differences and Sample of Outbound U.S. 
Affiliate Sales Versus Sample of Inbound U.S. Affiliate Sales 
 
Regressors 
 
Sample with 
positive skill 
differences 
Sample with 
negative skill 
differences 
 
Outbound 
Sample 
 
Inbound 
Sample 
 
GDP Sum 
 
     9.21** 
(5.86) 
 
    13.14** 
(4.04) 
 
    15.50** 
(9.16) 
 
    22.37** 
(8.18) 
GDP Difference Squared - 0.0014** 
(-7.5) 
- 0.0012** 
(-3.56) 
- 0.0045** 
     (-15.08) 
- 0.0024** 
(-7.10) 
Skill Difference  
(= Skillp - Skillh) 
- 81147** 
(-2.83) 
220693** 
(2.66) 
 - 1575770** 
     (-13.02) 
989126** 
(7.78) 
Skill Difference * GDP 
Difference  (= (Skillp - Skillh)* 
(GDPp - GDPh )) 
5.33 
(1.50) 
      - 10.82 
(-1.49) 
  289.95** 
      (12.87) 
   172.4** 
(7.34) 
 
Investment Cost Host - 522.3** 
(-3.96) 
       - 1097 
(-1.37) 
  - 1031** 
       (-7.88) 
389.2 
(0.36) 
Trade Cost Host 52.3 
(0.47) 
        - 46.3 
(-0.12) 
  417.8** 
        (4.37) 
- 39.7 
(-0.12) 
Trade Cost Host * Squared 
Skill Difference 
        3863 
       (1.82) 
27825* 
(2.50) 
        540.6 
        (0.33) 
-3047 
(-1.11) 
Trade Cost Parent     - 420.5* 
      (-2.46) 
        - 73.0 
(-0.52) 
        123.4 
        (0.52) 
         - 2.80 
(-0.03) 
Distance - 1.59** 
      (-6.25) 
   - 2.21** 
(-5.14) 
  - 2.17** 
       (-8.16) 
     - 0.73** 
(-2.67) 
Intercept 46694** 
       (2.86) 
       34589 
(0.88) 
92987** 
        (5.56) 
       -52763 
(-1.23) 
 
Observations 
 
306 
 
 203 
 
310 
 
199 
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.45 0.67 0.64 
NOTES:  p = parent, h = host.  t-statistics are in parentheses with ** and * denoting statistical 
significance (two-tailed test) at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 3: Marginal Effects of Skill Differences on Real Affiliate Sales/Stock Evaluated at the Means 
of the Data.
 
 
 
 
Model 
Change in real 
affiliate sales/stock for 
a standard deviation 
change in skill 
differences 
 
 
 
F-Statistic 
(P-value) 
 
 
 
Sample average real 
affiliate sales/stock 
 
CMM Sample 
CMM OLS Difference Model 
(Column 1 of table 2) 
 
 
 3308 
 
 
10.66 
(0.000) 
 
 
15767 
OLS Absolute Difference Model 
(Column 2 of table 2) 
-7137 65.02 
(0.000) 
15767 
CMM Tobit Difference Model 
(Column 3 of table 2) 
 2981 53.88 
(0.000) 
12779 
Tobit Absolute Difference Model  
(Column 4 of table 2) 
-6531 127.25 
(0.000) 
12779 
OLS Difference Model, Positive 
Sample (Column 1 of Table 3) 
-2119 3.68 
(0.056) 
14589 
OLS Difference Model, Negative 
Sample (Column 2 of Table 3) 
 6576 10.77 
(0.001) 
17542 
OLS Difference Model, Outbound 
Sample (Column 3 of Table 3) 
-2329 3.96 
(0.048) 
15942 
OLS Difference Model, Inbound 
Sample (Column 4 of Table 3) 
 7975 50.03 
(0.000) 
15494 
 
Modified U.S. Sample 
OLS Absolute Difference Model 
(Column 2 of table 5) 
 
 
-15966 
 
 
216.6 
(0.000) 
 
 
20821 
 
OECD Sample 
OLS Absolute Difference Model 
(Column 4 of table 5) 
 
 
-3361 
 
 
90.92 
(0.000) 
 
 
4322 
Notes: All marginal effects are calculated at the means of the data.  Real affiliate sales (real stock for OECD) 
are in millions of real U.S. dollars.  Wald statistic, not F-statistic, was calculated for Tobit marginal effects. 
 
19 
Table 4: OLS Results for Modified U.S. Sample and OECD Sample. 
 Modified U.S. Sample  OECD Sample 
 
Regressors 
 
Difference  
Model 
 Absolute 
Difference 
Model 
  
Difference  
Model 
  Absolute 
Difference 
Model 
 
GDP Sum 
 
   34.38** 
(15.58) 
 
      30.81** 
(16.58) 
 
      9.28** 
(25.88) 
 
     9.26** 
(26.25) 
GDP Difference Squared - 0.0035** 
(-9.06) 
 - 0.0107** 
(-21.36) 
- 0.0007** 
(-7.22) 
- 0.0004** 
(-4.51) 
Skill Difference  
(= Skillp - Skillh) 
    1859** 
(4.46) 
 
 
   272.5** 
(2.56) 
 
Skill Difference * GDP 
Difference (= (Skillp - Skillh)* 
(GDPp - GDPh)) 
- 0.24 
(-0.97) 
    - 0.69** 
(-10.76) 
 
 
Absolute Skill Difference 
( = | Skillp - Skillh | ) 
  - 58510** 
(-18.82) 
        - 141.5 
(-0.78) 
Absolute Skill Difference * 
Absolute GDP Difference    
(=  | Skillp - Skillh | * |GDPp - 
GDPh | ) 
     12.34** 
(16.77) 
     - 0.97** 
(-12.27) 
Investment Cost Host  - 763.7** 
(-4.87) 
143.3 
(1.93) 
 - 46.2* 
(-2.27) 
        - 5.58 
(-0.29) 
Trade Cost Host 68.9 
(1.80) 
- 172.4** 
(-4.84) 
- 4.14 
(-0.92) 
 - 15.93** 
(-3.56) 
Trade Cost Host * Squared 
Skill Difference 
  - 5.18** 
(-3.61) 
   4.66** 
(3.18) 
   - 1.38** 
(-4.78) 
        - 0.30 
(-0.96) 
Trade Cost Parent         18.31 
(27.09) 
        - 16.5 
(-0.73) 
   - 69.9** 
(-1.46) 
   - 55.1** 
(-4.88) 
Distance   - 3.09** 
(-6.61) 
   - 2.13** 
(-5.42) 
    -0.25** 
(-5.74) 
   - 0.24** 
(-5.49) 
Intercept     - 26122* 
(-2.01) 
104349** 
(8.00) 
        726.5 
(0.77) 
      - 443.6 
(-0.50) 
 
Observations 
 
 778 
 
778 
 
2460 
 
2460 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.67  0.37  0.39 
NOTES:  p = parent, h = host.  t-statistics are in parentheses with ** and * denoting statistical significance 
(two-tailed test) at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
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Appendix 
 
 This appendix provides details on data sources and variable construction for the modified U.S. and 
OECD data samples used in the econometric analysis reported in Table 5.   
 
U.S. Modified Sample 
As in CMM, we rely on U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on affiliate sales for our 
dependent variable.  We converted our affiliate sales into millions of real U.S. dollars using the U.S. GDP 
deflator as reported in the Economic Report of the President and the yearly average exchange rate as reported 
by the International Monetary Funds International Financial Statistics.  Affiliate sales are perhaps the most 
reliable measure of FDI activity (as opposed to FDI flows or stocks) since they can be compared across time 
and industries with less concern over divergent accounting methodologies.  These data are available at the 
BEA’s Internet site and go back to 1983 for U.S. outbound sales and 1984 for U.S. inbound sales, though data 
availability concerns with respect to other sample variables limited CMM to using only data after 1986.  Our 
alternative proxies discussed next allow our sample to extend back to 1983 and 1984 for U.S. outbound and 
inbound affiliate sales, respectively.  
For variables using real GDP in both the modified U.S. and OECD samples, we use the Penn World 
Tables real GDP measures available at http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/ and described by 
Summers and Heston (1991).  In contrast, the CMM database constructs real GDP data from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund.  The Penn World Tables data only 
extend until 1992, while the IFS data allowed CMM’s sample to extend until 1994.  However, the Penn 
World Tables go to great lengths to derive real GDP measures in billions of constant U.S. dollars that ensure 
comparability across countries, so it provides a viable alternative to the IFS data.    
 To construct an alternative proxy for country skill abundance, we turn to Barro and Lee data on 
educational attainment, and define a country’s skilled-labor abundance as the average educational attainment.  
These data run until 1990, so we repeat 1990 values for 1991 and 1992.  Our measure of skilled labor 
contrasts with CMM’s use of annual surveys conducted by the International Labour Organization to construct 
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measures of skilled labor to total employment by country and year.  Specifically, their measure is the 
percentage of total employment that is employed in categories 0/1 (professional, technical, and kindred 
workers) and 2 (administrative workers).  One concern with their data is comparability of classification 
schemes across countries (e.g., Japan’s share of skilled labor force averages half that of the U.S. and other 
developed countries).  Interestingly, for the observations in the CMM database the correlation between the 
ILO skill measure and our Barro and Lee education measure is 0.87. 
 The variables that provide the largest check on the CMM sample size because of data availability is 
the trade and investment cost proxies.  CMM rely on data from the World Economic Forum (WEF) which 
provide indicators based on extensive surveys for a limited number of years and countries.  For our measure 
of investment barriers, we use the composite score compiled by Business Environment Risk Intelligence, S.A. 
(BERI).  This composite includes measures of political risk, financial risk, and other economic indicators and  
ranges between zero and 100, with higher numbers meaning more openness.  To compare these estimates to 
previously used measures of investment barriers, we define Investment Barriers as 100 minus the BERI’s 
composite score.  The BERI measure allows us to consider more countries over a longer time period than 
CMM.  There is a strong relation between the two, with a correlation of 0.81 for the observations in the CMM 
database.  As an alternative to the WEF trade cost measures, we use the trade openness measures from the 
Penn World Tables, which are defined as the sum of a country’s imports and exports divided by the countries 
GDP.  We define trade costs as 100 minus this trade openness measure.  The correlation between this measure 
of trade openness and the WEF for overlapping observations is much lower than for the investment cost 
proxies; only around 0.20.   
The resulting U.S. modified sample, using these alternative proxies for real GDP, skilled labor 
abundance, and trade and investment costs, covers 51 countries and years from 1983-1992.  Appendix Table 
A1 gives summary statistics for the variables used in the U.S. modified sample. 
OECD Sample 
Unfortunately, very few OECD countries keep track of affiliate sales, and there is no comprehensive 
cross-country database of foreign affiliate sales activity, even for OECD countries.  Thus, when considering 
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the OECD sample, we must resort to data on bilateral FDI stocks as reported by OECD-member countries.  
These data are reported in the OECD’s International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook.10   Since the data 
are collected from national sources in each country, there is substantial variation in coverage by country 
source and by year, and there is variation in measurement of FDI activity itself.  On the whole, about half of 
the OECD countries report measures of inward and outward stocks of FDI for some countries and for some 
years.  The earliest data available begin in 1982.  Appendix Table A2 provides further details on data 
coverage across OECD countries and years in our sample.11  We converted our FDI variables into thousands 
of real U.S. dollars using the U.S. GDP deflator as reported in the Economic Report of the President and the 
yearly average exchange rate as reported by the International Monetary Funds International Financial 
Statistics. 
 For control regressors, we use the Blonigen-Davies-Head (BDH) alternative proxies described above 
for the U.S. modified sample.  Combining this with the OECD data on FDI outbound stock across countries 
and time we have a database that spans 15 OECD parent countries, and 38 host countries (some OECD and 
some non-OECD) over the years 1982 through 1992.12  This leaves 2460 observations and Appendix Table 
A3 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the OECD sample. 
 
                                                          
10 These data are available in print form in these annual yearbooks or in electronic form on the OECD Statistical 
Compendium CD-ROM, available for purchase from the OECD.  
11 There are some comparability concerns of FDI measures across countries.  For example, a number of OECD countries 
do not include reinvested earnings by firms in their measures of FDI. Countries can also differ in what percentage of 
foreign-owned shares of a firm are necessary for it to be classified as FDI rather than portfolio investment.  IMF and 
OECD guidelines specify investment as FDI when acquired shares are ten percent or higher of target firm’s outstanding 
stock, which many of the countries follow or eventually adopted.  Graham and Krugman (1993) find that the foreign 
parent of a MNE in the U.S. on average owns 77.5 percent of the affiliates equity, suggesting that this problem may not 
be overwhelming.  However, with only a couple exceptions, we note that FDI definitions are fairly consistent for the 
same country over time.  
12 We gathered data on outbound FDI stock only, since most of the reported data on OECD FDI activity is between 
OECD countries, with some information on FDI stock of OECD countries in non-OECD countries that involve 
substantial FDI activity.  Inbound FDI stock data would only reveal new observations of non-OECD investment into 
OECD countries, for which there were relatively few instances of such recorded data. 
 
26 
Table A1: Summary Statistics for Modified U.S. Sample. 
NOTES:  p = parent, h = host.  Affiliate sales and FDI stock measured in millions of real U.S. dollars.   
GDP terms in billions of real U.S. dollars. 
 
 
Variables 
Observa- 
tions 
 
Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Real Affiliate Sales 
 
778 
 
20821 
 
40630 
 
0 
 
267401 
GDP Sum 778 4523.0 484.2 3610.2 6449.0 
GDP Difference Squared 778 1.59e+07 3377850 5277082 2.09e+07 
BDH Skill Difference  
(= Educp - Educh) 
778 - 0.04 5.19 -9.51 9.51 
BDH Skill Difference * GDP 
Difference 
778 18349 9687.6 -6407.9 41584 
Absolute BDH Skill Difference 778 4.67 2.23 0.32 9.51 
Absolute BDH Skill Difference 
* Absolute GDP Difference    
778 18579 9236.9 744.3 41584 
BDH Investment Cost Host 778 37.8 13.3 17.3 70.4 
BDH Trade Cost Host  778 58.7 44.2 -278.8 91.0 
BDH Trade Cost Host * 
Squared Skill Difference 
778 1723.6 1924.8 -5335.8 7337.4 
BDH Trade Cost Parent 778 56.0 46.1 -278.8 91.0 
Distance 778 5077.8 2370.8 455.0 10163.0 
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Table A2: Coverage of OECD FDI Stock Data 
Notes: Number of partner countries reported are for 1990. Not all reported countries are necessarily 
reported each year during range indicated. 
 
 
Country 
 
Direction of FDI Stocks 
Number of Partner 
Countries Reporteda 
 
Years Coveredb 
Australia Inbound 
Outbound 
17 
12 
1982- 
1982- 
Austria Inbound 
Outbound 
9 
11 
1982, 1986- 
1982, 1986- 
Canada Inbound 
Outbound 
29 
30 
1982- 
1982- 
Finland Inbound 1 1989- 
France Inbound 
Outbound 
43 
34 
1987- 
1987- 
Italy Inbound 
Outbound 
22 
23 
1985- 
1985- 
Japan Inbound 
Outbound 
9 
37 
1982- 
1982- 
Netherlands Inbound 
Outbound 
14 
14 
1984- 
1984- 
Norway Inbound 
Outbound 
18 
24 
1987- 
1988- 
United Kingdom Inbound 
Outbound 
19 
35 
1982- 
1984, 1987- 
United States Inbound 
Outbound 
28 
41 
1982- 
1982- 
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Table A3: Summary Statistics for OECD Sample. 
NOTES:  p = parent, h = host.  Affiliates sales and FDI stock measured in millions of real U.S. dollars.   
GDP terms in billions of real U.S. dollars.  
 
Variables 
Observa- 
tions 
 
Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Real FDI Stock 
 
2460 
 
4321.5 
 
11762 
 
-357.1 
 
176781 
GDP Sum 2460 1674.1 1497.7 73.0 6449.0 
GDP Difference Squared 2460 3156324 5820788 0 2.09e+07 
BDH Skill Difference  
(= Educp - Educh) 
2460 1.65 2.69 -5.40 8.10 
BDH Skill Difference * GDP 
Difference 
2460 3401.2 6459.6 -6995.7 31011 
Absolute BDH Skill Difference 2460 2.55 1.86 0.01 8.10 
Absolute BDH Skill Difference 
* Absolute GDP Difference    
2460 3850.4 6202.3 0.03 31011 
BDH Investment Cost Host 2460 42.0 12.3 17.3 65.0 
BDH Trade Cost Host  2460 31.3 59.3 -286.2 87.3 
BDH Trade Cost Host * 
Squared Skill Difference 
2460 422.6 1050.1 -6559.1 5599.5 
BDH Trade Cost Parent 2460 52.0 22.3 -18.8 82.04 
Distance 2460 6302.6 4791.6 174.0 18372 
